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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

BY

COLONEL D. J. HURLEY Australian Army

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#### USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

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#### ABSTRACT

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The Australian Army has commenced a restructuring process which places emphasis on capabilities for short warning conflict. paper addresses three challenges facing the Army as it restructures: firstly, the Army's ability to transition from short warning conflict to more substantial conflict; secondly, the Army's ability to conduct joint and combined operations; and thirdly, the Army's ability to participate in regional In meeting each of these challenges a requirement to engagement. retain a capability for conventional operations has been identified. In the process of restructuring, the Army must balance its requirements for the conduct of short warning conflict with the retention of conventional capabilities. Planning to achieve this balance must be conducted in parallel with, and have the same priority as, planning for restructuring implementation.

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The Australian Army has commenced a long term restructuring process that is both evolutionary and revolutionary. The army that will emerge from the restructuring process will be radically different from the army of today. The impetus for this change was the confluence of three major factors: the change in the world strategic environment, budgetary pressures and advances in technology. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) recognised the influence that these factors would have on the role, structure and employment of land forces and directed in July 1994 that a review of the Army's structure, entitled 'The Army in the 21st Century' Review (A21 Review) be conducted. This requirement was subsequently included in the 1994 Defence White Paper 'Defending Australia' (DA94). The A21 Review report has been completed and approved in principle by the Minister for Defence. Critically, a change in Government occurred after the completion of the Review and before its findings were approved by the previous Government. This change has created some uncertainty with regard to the continuity of the strategic guidance upon which the Review was predicated.

The force structure proposed by the A21 Review abandons the conventional division and brigade structures of the Army. Standing combined arms task forces, similar in many ways to independent brigades, will be created with predetermined unit allocations and Areas of Operations. The final structure of the individual units is still subject to trial. The command and control arrangements for the task forces will reflect the recently revised Australian Defence Force (ADF) higher command and control system.

This paper will analyse the effect that these significant changes will have on the Australian Army. The analysis will commence with a consideration of the major influences on the development of the force structure proposal. Three major implications of the proposed restructuring for the Army will then be examined: firstly, the ability of the Army to transition from short warning conflict to more substantial conflict; secondly, the Army's ability to conduct joint and combined operations; and thirdly, the Army's ability to participate in regional engagement.

#### THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

Three broad reasons for change were given in the introduction to this paper. In a recent speech to the Chief of the General Staff's annual conference, the Deputy Chief of Staff recognised a number of major factors as influences for change. These factors were:

- The Changing World Strategic Environment. The Australian Army is presently structured to be interoperable with allies and for expansion within a Cold War strategic framework. The cessation of the Cold War has brought regional strategic uncertainties and a commitment to wider international issues, such as Peace Support Operations. The Army must be able to operate within this new environment.
- Primacy of 'Self-Reliance' in Defence Policy. Since 1972

  Australia has been on a path of self-reliance in national defence policy. Under the Labor Government of 1983 to 1996 this policy matured to become one of the cornerstones of DA94. The present Australian Army force

- structure does not reflect the priorities and requirements of that policy.
- Interval Since the Last Major Review. An unhealthy state existed with the last major review of the Army's force structure being the Hassett Review in the early 1970s.

  This review concentrated on the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Service Offices and did not impact on the structure of combat formations and units.

  A number of attempts to review Army's structure were made subsequently during the 1980s, but none of these gained sufficient support within Army or the Defence Organisation to be implemented.
- Affordability. Growing tension between assets and liabilities in the Army budget, resulting in an alarming hollowness of units, meant that Army could no longer continue its current practices.<sup>1</sup>

#### UNCERTAINTIES IN STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The 1994 White Paper was the last major pronouncement on defence policy made by the Labor Government prior to its defeat in the March 1996 election. The A21 Review, which commenced under the Labor Government, was predicated on the strategic tenets of that Paper. In general, this strategic guidance provided the Review with the nature and level of operations to be considered, the scale and location of the theatre, and force structure constraints. For the Land Force, two factors were emphasised:

• The defence of mainland Australia was to be confined to the mainland and the offshore territories. Forward deployments would not be included. The A21 Review Terms of Reference directed "a number of assumptions that confirmed the focus of the Review was the defining of an appropriate force structure to satisfy the demands of the defence of Australia in short-warning conflict." Shortwarning conflict, or 'credible contingencies', by definition, confines conflict to the Australian mainland and its offshore territories.

• Australia would rely on its own defence capabilities. The Review stated that "the Land Force should be capable of meeting the demands of short-warning conflict in defence of Australia, without relying on the assistance of combat forces of other countries." Critically, self-reliance directs that the conduct of combined and coalition operations should not be a force structure determinant, though interoperability issues need to be considered.

In response to this guidance the A21 Review produced a revised force structure that will radically transform the Army from a force structured for conventional operations to one structured for low level, high space-to-force ratio, mobile operations. The change of government in March 1996 has complicated the implementation of the Review's findings by indicating a possible change to strategic guidance. The Coalition Government has indicated an increased emphasis on the Army's ability to conduct offshore operations and, in concert with the other services, operations in support of regional and international interests.

This possible change in direction in strategic guidance has created an uncertainty that the restructuring process must now address. The effect of this uncertainty is to

broaden the spectrum of options for force structuring beyond that which the A21 Review was constrained to consider and possibly beyond what resources, in terms of funding, manpower and equipment, the Army can afford. The breadth of interpretation now possible of the required force structure can be seen in recent comments by the Land Commander, Major General Frank Hickling:

"As the defence minister has stated recently, our defence begins with the security of the region.

Australia's land force must be structured so that it is able to make a substantial contribution to regional security as a whole. It is also essential that we do not depart so radically from conventional structures (author's italics) that our force loses the ability to operate with our allies or in Coalition warfare. The future combat force organisation must provide us with the capability to do that."

#### THE ADF ENVIRONMENT

Before considering the proposed force structure of the Army it is important to understand the defence environment within which the restructuring will take place. In particular, the restructuring of the Army cannot be considered without understanding the recent changes to the ADF's higher command structure, and the primacy of joint doctrine within the ADF.

#### Revised ADF Command Structure

In 1995 the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) directed that the higher command system of the ADF was to be revised to ensure that responsibilities for strategic and operational leadership were exercised at the appropriate levels and that the ADF was structured for command and control in peace as it would be for war. The key element of the revised command system is the creation of Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQ AST), an operational level headquarters resting between HQ ADF, the strategic level headquarters, and the combat formations and units at the

tactical level within each service. Figure 1 depicts the revised system.

The revised higher command structure will remove all Army single service headquarters above brigade level other than the Land Force Component of HQ AST. The Army will therefore lose the ability to command more than one brigadesized formation at the tactical or operational level. This decision firmly couched all Army operations in a joint environment under one of three joint headquarters:

Headquarters Northern Command and either of the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Land) or (Sea). The A21 Review Team had to be cognizant of this command system and the scale and nature of land force operations it implied; that is, operations at the independent brigade level in a joint environment.

#### Joint Doctrine

The ADF has fully embraced the concept of joint operations and the synergy of force that such operations create. Although separate service doctrines are still necessary, they are subordinate to joint doctrine. The primacy of joint doctrine required the A21 Review to consider the Army's future structure within a joint

operating environment. The inference that must be drawn from this is that the resulting force structure should be capable of supporting joint doctrine and, more importantly, should be capable of advancing joint doctrine. A key assessment of the outcome of the Review is whether or not it has achieved this. Any restructuring that reduces Army's present level of joint capability would be unacceptable.

#### THE PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE

The force structure model which emerged from the A21
Review is that of an integrated full-time/part-time Army
consisting of modern, high mobility task forces and units,
capable of more autonomous operations of a widely dispersed
and dynamic nature. The proposed Army structure is shown
in outline in Figure 2. The most significant changes from
the present force are:

- A change from a two division, ten brigade, 21 infantry battalion structure to seven independent task forces, each task force varying in the number and type of units allocated.
- The proposal to embed combined arms capabilities within units as opposed to the current practice of regrouping for task requirements from single Corps (US Branch) units.
- The creation of task forces at the brigade-equivalent level with headquarters permanently staffed with representatives from all services.

The conversion of Headquarters 1st Division to a
 Deployable Joint Force Headquarters which can function at either the operational or tactical level as the situation demands, and the dissolution of Headquarters 2nd
 Division.

#### Concept of Operations

The Land Force concept of operations provided by strategic guidance is characterised as having three operational dimensions: detection by surveillance and reconnaissance; protection of assets and infrastructure; and response in order to intercept and defeat hostile forces. 

It is anticipated that each unit in a task force will contain elements of detection, protection and response forces in a ratio determined by the unit's tasks and geographic location.

Within this concept of operations the generic missions that the A21 Review determined that the Land Force will be required to conduct are:

- Protecting population centres and infrastructure.
- Detecting incursions and lodgments.
- Defeating incursions and lodgments on the mainland.

- Securing the offshore territories.
- Conducting strategic strike.
- Conducting special recovery.
- Maintaining a strategic reserve.
- Enabling the combat force (mobilisation, base support and individual training).
- Reinforcing and rotating force elements.<sup>7</sup>

#### Core Concept

The Land Force concept of operations complies with the embryonic ADF core, or strategic, concept which establishes the operational environment, in terms of its scale and joint character, in which land forces are to be employed. The key elements of the core concept are:

• Joint Nature of Operations. "The Army's structure is designed to operate in concert with the other services in the execution of a joint strategy for the defence of Australia." This element reinforces the point that the Army's structure must support, and preferably enhance, the conduct of joint operations.

• Scale of Land Force Operations. The core concept does not deem a large scale invasion of Australia as credible:

"Operations of this scale were identified as being at the end of the adversary capability spectrum judged to be the least credible in the shorter term." The Army would most likely be employed against small forces, possibly Special Forces, which could penetrate the sea-air gap.

"Traditional protective operations will be replaced by highly mobile and pro-active detection and response operations." The Army will not, therefore, be structured to counter medium to large scale conventionally equipped land forces.

#### Principles

The changes to the force structure were based on ten principles, of which the following are relevant to this paper:

Adaptability, Versatility and Deployability. This
principle defines the approach that will be taken to
retain the Army's capability to expand in size and in the
conventional capabilities necessary for more substantial
conflict. "The force is adaptable to the demands of more

substantial conflict, and sufficiently versatile to perform other tasks which the government of the day may require. The force is capable of being deployed on a wider range of missions than the current force."

- Joint Task Forces with Embedded Capabilities. This principle changes the basic nature of unit structures. The Review used this principle to determine the balance of detect, protect and response capabilities the Army required in units to conduct operations in specified geographic areas. When the units were then grouped into task forces, the task forces, by definition, became geographic specific formations. "The current brigades will be developed into joint task forces and supporting formations. Units may be structured with combined arms assets permanently embedded, rather than grouped on a temporary basis to meet a particular operational need." 12
- Concepts of Operations. This principle highlights the joint nature of ADF and Army operations. "Army is to be structured in accordance with the demands of the core concept...The core concept will also be used in the development (of) Land Force doctrine for the defence of

Australia, and as part of Army's contribution to the development of relevant joint doctrine." 13

• Enhanced Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence. This principle is critical to the
development of joint and combined capabilities. "A
priority has been attached to the provision of a C3I
system. This system will be developed to enable
adjustments to the rate of effort in the three
operational dimensions (detection, protection and
response), to manage and to reallocate scarce assets, and
to conduct civil liaison over the vast distances of the
north." 14

In summary, the proposed force structure is specifically designed to conduct short warning conflict at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare. This is evident in the list of generic land force missions. The Army should be capable, however, of rapidly expanding to meet more significant threats. In the following sections of this paper the adaptability and versatility of the structure to meet Australia's existing, and possible future, defence and security requirements will be examined.

#### THE TRANSITION TO MORE SUBSTANTIAL CONFLICT

The ability of the Army to transition quickly to a force capable of operations in more substantial conflict will be critical should strategic guidance change or Australia's security situation deteriorate. The A21 Review, under the guiding principle of "Adaptability, Versatility and Deployability', states that this requirement has been incorporated in the proposed structure. The proposed structure is described as "...adaptable to the demands of more substantial conflict, and sufficiently versatile to perform other tasks which the government of the day may require... the force is not an expansion base (but) it can be expanded systematically to meet the demands of more demanding conflicts, and to make more substantial deployments in support of our alliance obligations."15 Despite this statement the proposed force structure does not include at an appropriate strength or operational level some of the conventional capabilities necessary for expansion for more substantial conflict.

A key indicator of the effective application of the "Adaptability" principle is the proposed force structure's ability to conduct manoeuvre. The requirements of manoeuvre: doctrine, mobility assets, firepower, and command and control; are the building blocks for conventional operations or operations in more substantial conflict.

The Army's ability to conduct manoeuvre is constrained at the highest levels by a defence strategy that does not facilitate strategic manoeuvre. Australia's defence strategy directs that a defensive posture of depth-indefence be adopted. In addition to the actual deployment of forces, depth-in-defence includes the harnessing of the nation's resources "to provide the greatest practicable opposition to any adversary." In geographic terms, the first layer of defence is the sea-air gap to Australia's north, and the second layer, the vastness of northern Australia. Each of these layers is to be defended by joint operations. This posture in a short warning conflict scenario provides limited opportunity for strategic military manoeuvre as Michael Evans suggests; "It is possible that short warning conflict as a guidance concept may be inadequate to accommodate strategic manoeuvre-especially if

strategic manoeuvre in the Australian Army context is defined as the ability to tailor the preparation of operations to meet all potential national defence requirements. Such a definition would encompass a full range of contingencies from low level war to major conflict or deployment in a coalition force."

Within this strategic constraint manoeuvre will be conducted at the operational and tactical level in joint and single-service settings. A number of limitations and strengths of the proposed structure can be identified with regard to the conduct of manoeuvre at these levels. A major limitation on land force operations will be a reduced ability to manoeuvre at or above the tactical level. tactical level in this context is at the task force level. The proposed force structure implies that the task forces will operate within fixed regional boundaries or Areas of Operation, and be composed of units designed to conduct detection, protection and response operations. The Review does not state nor imply that task forces will manoeuvre as entities in a manner similar, for example, to mechanised or motorised brigades. The proposed force structure's emphasis is on manoeuvre at the unit level where highly mobile units

with enhanced situational awareness capabilities will be employed. The Army will only possess one formation-level organisation is the 'force-in-being' capable of manoeuvring as a formation - the Theatre Response Task Force. This compares with the present Army's structure in which three brigades are designated as manoeuvre brigades.

The proposed 'force-in-being's' limited ability to conduct manoeuvre operations will make it difficult to comply with the principle of 'adaptability and versatility' which is the key to the creation of a conventional force for more substantial conflict. Many of the basics of conventional operations will need to be developed, for example: combined arms operations above sub-unit level; formation level manoeuvre; coordination of offensive fire support above sub-unit level; and command and control in manoeuvre warfare. This limitation, and the Army's emphasis on low level operations, have important consequences for the Army's ability to expand and transition, even with adequate warning time, to conduct conventional operations in more substantial conflict.

A further difficulty in complying with the principle of 'adaptability' will be the task of developing doctrine and

conducting individual and collective training for the 'force-in-being' while at the same time developing doctrine and providing professional education to sustain a conventional operations capability for more substantial conflict. The success of professional education, without the opportunity for practical application, in preparing the Army for more substantial conflict relies entirely on adequate warning time being available to capitalise on the professional education base when transforming the Army into a conventionally capable force. Although the A21 Review acknowledges this difficulty in its principles for change, little evidence of its practical implementation can be found in the proposed force structure. In the difficult process of implementing the immediate and mid-term goals of the restructuring process, planning for the transition to more substantial conflict must be conducted.

#### JOINT OPERATIONS

The ADF has made significant progress and given great weight to the development of a joint capability. Jointness' is at the heart of ADF doctrine and is defined as "activities, operations, organisations in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate." The test that the restructuring of the Army must meet is whether the Army will enhance and progress the development of jointness. It must be stressed that a joint capability goes further then the definition implies. It is not merely the conduct of strategic, operational or tactical level operations by one service supported by either or both of the other services. Jointness is the synergy of the application of the three services in manoeuvre to gain an advantage over the enemy.

In short warning conflict the Army is likely to be involved in the following joint operations which the proposed force structure retains in a qualified manner:

Airborne operations, including parachute and airland operations.

- Amphibious operations, limited to Amphibious Tactical
   Lodgments, Advance Force Operations and Logistics Over
   The Shore.
- Air and naval offensive support.
- Defence of offshore territories.

The most obvious advantage that the restructured Army will bring to the joint capability is the formation of standing joint headquarters at the task force (brigade) level. This change will create a chain of joint headquarters from HQ ADF to formation level. The Army, and the ADF, have sorely lacked this command and control capability in the past, relying on a single liaison officer on the permanent staff of key brigades and division headquarters and ad hoc augmentation for operations and exercises. The proposal to include RAN and RAAF personnel in significant numbers on each task force headquarters must, however, be wholeheartedly supported by the services to achieve this potential for progress. Similarly, Army must reciprocate in the manning of Headquarters Northern Command and the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Sea).

The other major boost to further developing a joint capability will be the growing interoperability of single service C4I systems. Although not a direct initiative of A21 and the restructuring process, the Army has highlighted and actively supported the development of interoperability of Command Support Systems (CSS), realising the vital role interoperability of these systems will play in task force headquarters. It is likely that Army will retain its CSS - AUSTACSS - for which connectivity will be developed with JP2030, the higher level CSS to be adopted by HQ ADF and the other services.

The proposed force structure will retain the same capability for airborne operations, and air and naval offensive operations, that currently exists. The 3rd Brigade will retain its emphasis on airborne operations throughout the force restructuring implementation period. The Brigade will evolve into a task force equipped and structured for offshore operations and for short notice operations not directly related to the defence of Australia, such as Peace Support Operations. With regard to air and naval offensive support, all the task forces will have the capability to employ these assets. The capability of the

restructured Army to defend the offshore territories will be enhanced by the raising of a garrison battalion and independent companies for this task.

The one joint capability that will vary in a quantitative sense is the conduct of amphibious operations. The number of formations that can conduct amphibious operations will be reduced from three to one. Presently, the 1st, 3rd and 6th Brigades can conduct amphibious operations, albeit at varying levels of proficiency. The restructured Army has only one task force, the Theatre Response Force, capable of formation level amphibious operations. Given that amphibious operations are a major manoeuvre option in the defence of Australia this decrease in manoeuvre formations reflects the impact of geographically constrained task force operations.

Overall, the proposed force structure maintains and will eventually enhance the Army's ability to conduct joint operations. The major area of concern is the limited number of formations available to conduct amphibious operations.

#### COMBINED OPERATIONS

#### International Trends

Neither Australia's major ally the United States nor Australia's regional neighbours have embarked on a similar path to that chosen by the Australia Army in developing land forces to meet current and future security requirements.

The US Army for the foreseeable future will rely on a technologically enhanced, conventionally structured force.

Within Asia the thrust amongst land forces is to gain modern conventional equipment for forces that are being transformed from an orientation towards counter-revolutionary warfare to conventional warfare. The Australian Army in comparison will be uniquely structured for the specific task of defending the Australian mainland.

#### The Requirement for Combined and Coalition Operations

The current strategic guidance for the ADF includes a requirement to conduct combined or coalition operations.

This requirement will almost certainly be stressed in future strategic guidance. Combined and coalition operations can cover the complete military spectrum of activities from

Operations Other Then War to more substantial conflict.

Given the trend for Australia's likely combined and coalition partners to remain focused on conventional operations the Army cannot afford to limit itself to the conduct of operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum if it is to be an equal partner in combined and coalition operations. It must have a capability to conduct operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. It is this requirement that General Hickling referred to in his previously quoted statement.

Determining the Army's ability to meet this requirement brings together several conflicting issues:

- Australia's defence policy of self-reliance which does not foresee the intervention of outside combat forces in the defence of Australia.
- That participation in combined operations is not to be used as a force structure determinant. Although this guidance was provided in the "Defence of Australia" 1987

  White Paper little practical evidence of its application was evident until the A21 Review.

- The Government's statements on foreign policy and defence that give a high priority to regional engagement.
- The Government's insistence that Army be capable of conducting combined, or coalition, operations.

The interplay of these issues presents the Army with both short and long term problems in its restructuring process. Pending the resolution by the Government of its national security policy these problems may require the Army to balance its conventional and short warning conflict capabilities more finely and for a longer period then the A21 Review proposal indicates.

The question therefore arises as to what degree and at what operational levels does the proposed force structure possess the characteristics and capabilities necessary to conduct combined operations in a conventional warfare environment. The key to any successful combined operation is the possession of, or the ability to develop, compatible C4I systems, doctrine, tactics and procedures. The A21 Review is confident that "...the structures can meet all United Nations tasks that the current force can, but have

enhanced capability to provide effective reconnaissance, air defence and Special Forces for coalition operations." 19

This confidence, however, is questionable above unit level operations. In order to conduct combined operations the Army will require a range of capabilities similar to that required for the conduct of manoeuvre above the tactical level. As previously shown it will not possess these capabilities widely in the proposed force structure. Further, the composition of the proposed task forces and units is very different to the forces with which the Army is likely to conduct combined operations. This will create difficulty in developing and practising the doctrine, tactics and procedures necessary for combined operations with conventionally structured allies or partners. An important example of this is the application of indirect fire support. The A21 Review states that this capability will be limited to below unit level: "Unit level indirect fire support could not be provided to coalition forces."20 In comparison the present Army structure can provide indirect fire support up to the Divisional level. This loss of capability will result from indirect fire support assets being embedded at sub-unit level within units with a

predominately 'response' task. There will not be the capability within task forces to centralise these sub-units to provide unit level indirect fire support.

The Review further requires that "...the capability to conduct higher level conventional operations should be held at least in seed form. There should be a capability both to ...create new units and formations based on capabilities not extant in the force-in-being."<sup>21</sup> Although the Review recognises the need to retain a conventional capability in a seed form it does not define the capabilities to be retained nor the size or level of retention. The question also arises whether the Army will have sufficient resources available to maintain 'seed forces', including training, for more substantial conflict. The Army needs to ensure that these requirements do not fall by the wayside as the priority of effort is given to transforming the Army for its primary mission, the defence of mainland Australia.

As the Army restructures, it needs to address the following four major problem areas to enable it to retain a capability to conduct combined and coalition operations above the lower end of the conflict spectrum:

- A growing gap in the conventional capabilities of Army formations and units as they develop in response to doctrine specifically formulated for short warning conflict. This will impact on tactics, command and control, force structure and logistic support.
- The loss, over time, of experience in conventional operations which can only be partially offset by professional education.
- A decline in the Army's ability to contribute to regional engagement if regional countries continue their current direction of developing conventional forces.
- The lack of an element of the 'force-in-being' whose training emphasis is conventional operations in higher level conflict.

## REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Australia's foreign policy includes an active policy of regional engagement in Asia. In April 1996 the Foreign Minister stated that "...closer engagement with Asia is the Federal Government's highest foreign policy priority." 22 The ADF is an important player in that policy as recognised in DA94: "...Australia's engagement with regional countries as a partner in determining the strategic affairs of the region will be an increasingly important element in ensuring our security." 23 In December 1996 the Defence Minister defined the range of ADF activities in regional engagement as; high level visits, exercises, operational deployments, personnel attachments, exchanges, study visits and training programmes. The proposed force structure will be able successfully to continue the Army's role in this range of activities with the important exceptions of exercises, operational deployments, exchanges and training programmes.

The participation of Australian Army forces in regional exercises will be made difficult by a growing gap in interoperability created by the disparity between regional

force structure trends and that of the Australian Army.

Further, regional countries will face greater difficulty participating in Australian exercises whose scenarios and doctrinal foundations are geared for short warning conflict.

The danger for Army is that regional partners will find little utility in these exercises and seek to reduce their level and/or frequency of participation. Given the important, and often leading role, the Army has played in regional engagement in recent years such a reaction would seriously harm Australia's security policies.

A similar concern exists for exchanges and training programmes. At present the Army provides a wide range of courses for officers and soldiers of regional countries to attend. The Army also provides exchange instructors and advisors in some regional countries. As the Army evolves towards its new structure its ability to provide these openings for engagement will be reduced. The Army's changing doctrine will not be pertinent to regional countries needs. It would be of great concern if regional countries were to look elsewhere for the training and advice they currently receive from Army.

## CONCLUSION

The restructuring process that the Australian Army has now embarked upon faces a number of major challenges. This paper has addressed three of those challenges: firstly, the ability of the Army to transition from short warning conflict to more substantial conflict; secondly, the Army's ability to conduct joint and combined operations; and thirdly, the Army's ability to participate in regional engagement.

In each of these three issues the requirement for the Army to retain a conventional warfare capability in the 'force-in-being' has emerged. The capability should be retained at such a level so as to enable the Army to transition to more substantial conflict, conduct combined operations above unit level and effectively participate in regional engagement.

The proposed force structure will maintain the Army's current joint capability and will eventually enhance it. It would be desirable that the formation or element retaining

the conventional capability be capable of amphibious operations.

The overall challenge facing the Army is the balancing of its requirements for the conduct of short warning conflict in mainland Australia with the retention of conventional capabilities. Planning to achieve this balance must be conducted in concert with the restructuring implementation process and not delayed as a lower priority task.

FIGURE 1

ADF HIGHER COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE





FIGURE 2



## **ENDNOTES**

<sup>1</sup>J Mohan Malik, ed., <u>The Future Battlefield</u> (Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1997), 209-10.

<sup>2</sup>Australia, Department of Defence-Army, <u>Restructuring</u>
the <u>Australian Army (Draft)</u> (Canberra: 1997), 18.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., 67.

<sup>4</sup>Malik, 226.

<sup>5</sup>Australia, CGS Directive 7/96, <u>Restructuring of the</u>

<u>Australian Army Initiating Directive</u> (Canberra: 1996), 1.

<sup>6</sup>Malik, 215.

<sup>7</sup>ibid., 214.

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<sup>17</sup>Michael Evans, "Strategic Manoeuvre: A Study in Military Method and Policy Technique," Land Warfare Study Papers, Paper No. 1 (1996): 23.

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